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MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: MUST A
CHANGE TO MODEL RULE 5.4 APPLY TO
ALL LAW FIRMS UNIFORMLY?
Abstract: At the American Bar Association 2000 annual meeting,
delegates voted to reinforce Model Rule 5.4, prohibiting fee sharing
and partnership between lawyers and non-lawyers in arrangements
known as multidisciplinary practices. Nevertheless, the topic continues
to be controversial, primarily because the Big Five accounting firms are
hiring an increasing number of lawyers and expanding into services that
many argue constitute the practice of law. This Note asserts that
applying Rule 5.4 uniformly to law firms of all sizes is not in the best
interest of the small firms and solo practitioners that comprise the
majority of the legal profession; such firms and their clients would
benefit if small firms were allowed to participate in MDPs. The author
suggests, however, that such firms not be permitted to partner with
public auditing firms, whose duty to disclose client activity to the public
conflicts with the lawyer's duty to protect client confidences.
INTRODUCTION
Multidisciplinary practice (MDP) refers to a professional entity in
which a lawyer (or lawyers) partners with nonlawyers to provide both
legal and nonlegal services.' Control of the MDP may reside with ei-
ther the lawyers or nonlawyers, but in both situations lawyers are re-
quired to share fees for legal services with nonlawyers. 2
 This arrange-
ment squarely conflicts with the ethical rules regarding fee sharing
found in The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) prom-
ulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA) and adopted by all
jurisdictions in some form. 3 The topic has become more controversial
in recent years primarily due to the increased employment of lawyers
by the Big Five accounting firms (the Big Five) and their expansion of
I See Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1529,1529-30 (2000).
2 See id.
3 See id. The exception is the District of Columbia, which has adopted a modified ver-
sion,
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services that many argue constitute the "practice of law." These firms
have always employed attorneys to assist in their substantial tax prac-
tices.5
 With revenues from traditional audit services declining, how-
ever, many accounting firms have been forced to offer new services,
which has led to their expansion into the management consulting
field.6
This expansion has led accounting firms to offer clients services
that appear to closely resemble a law practice; such services include
advice regarding corporate mergers and acquisitions and regulatory
compliance.? The Big Five have already taken advantage of laws allow-
ing MDPs in Europe to develop significant law practices ahroad. 5
 They
are now mobilizing their powerful lobby in an effort to change the
laws in the United States to directly compete with law firms.9 If ac-
counting firms succeed, the way law is practiced in the United States
may never be the same. 10
 With so much at stake, emotions are high
and vocal advocates can be heard on both sides of the debate." Many
scholars and practitioners feel the MDP matter has emerged as the
most important issue facing the legal profession in recent times. 12
See id. at 1530-31. The Big Five Accounting firms are: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
Arthur Andersen LLP, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Ernst & Young LLP and Deloitte &
Touche LLP.
5 See Stein, supra note 1, at 1530, 1546.
See IA
7
 See id. at 1534.
8 See id. at 1536-37. For example, Arthur Andersen's legal arm, Andersen Legal, has a
network of 2,900 attorneys and more than 102 offices located in thirty-five countries. Ar-
thur Andersen website, at http://www.arthurAndersen.com/websitelegal.nsf (last visited
Oct. 9, 2000). Similarly, in 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) announced it would build
the fifth largest law firm in the world in the next five years with over $1 billion in fees and
3000 lawyers. PwC already has the second largest law firm in Spain. PwC website, at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/ncinthenews.nsf
 (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
9 Seek/h11 M. Covaleski, ABA Nixes MDPs, ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 24, 2000, at 1.
II See id.; see also Stein, supra note 1, at 1529.
n See, e.g., Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practices: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 1083, 1083-1654 (2000); The Phyllis W Beck Chair in Law Symposium: New Roles, No
Rules? &defining Lauryers' Work 72 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 773-1035 (1999).
12 See Stein, supra note 1, at 1537. Recently, a plan to create a new credential called the
"Cognitor" sponsored by a consortium of four international accounting associations has
caused MDP opponents to worry. See Mark Hansen, A New Credential A.B.A. J. 1, 18 (Feb.
2001). The first Cognitor title could be awarded in the summer of 2002. A Cognitor is a
tentative name for a proposed new global business credential that would recognize the
credential holder's ability to "provide a range of professional services, from accounting to
business law." Cognitor supporters consider the credential a solution to the changing
economy, filling the need of a one-stop-shop for professional services. This concept is very
similar to the arguments raised by MDP proponents and raises serious concern for those
against multidisciplinary practices. The legal profession will need to watch the develop-
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Rule 5.4 of The Model Rules clearly prohibits the creation of a
firm that delivers legal services and has partners who are both lawyers
and nonlawyers." Rule 5.4(a) provides that a "lawyer or law firm shall
not share legal fees with a nonlawyer." 14 Rule 5.4(b) further provides
that a "lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of
the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law."15 Fi-
nally, Rule 5.4(d) provides that a lawyer "shall not practice with or in
the form of a Professional Corporation or an Association authorized
to practice law if a nonlawyer has any interest therein, as a corporate
director or officer, or has the right to direct or control the profes-
sional judgment of the lawyer." 16 Thus, Rule 5.4 is the primary barrier
to MDP supporters, preventing nonlawyer professionals from partner-
ing with lawyers in an effort to serve the same clients."
The debate over MDPs is not new. In the 1980s, Robert Kutak
chaired an ABA Commission and made recommendations to relax the
fee sharing prohibition, allowing lawyers to partner with nonlawyers
and to share fees, provided the partnership only offered legal services
to a client." The District of Columbia was the only jurisdiction to
adopt Kutak's recommended modification to the Model Rules." The
ABA said little more on the subject until August of 1998 when Philip
S. Andersen, then President of the ABA, appointed a twelve person
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (the Commission) to exam-
ine the MDP issue.2° At the ABA's annual meeting in 1999, the Com-
mission presented its recommendation that MDPs be permitted.°
The Bar Delegates decided not to vote on the recommendation at
that time, stating they wanted additional time to study and fully digest
the report and findings of the Commission. 22 At the ABA's 2000 an-
tent of the Cognitor credential carefully and assess its impact on the legal profession. See
id.
18 See PROE'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 94 ( John S. Dzienkowski
ed., 1999).
14 Id. This rule is subject to certain exceptions.
'5 Id.
18 Id.
17 See id.
18 See Stein, supra note 1, at 1538. Robert J. Kutak was a lawyer from Omaha, Nebraska
who chaired the ABA's first commission to revamp the Model Code of Professional Con-
duct until his death in 1983. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Kutak Con -mis-
sion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. in August of 1983. See id.
19 See Stein, supra note 1, at 1538.
" See id. at 1539.
21 See id. at 1543.
81 See id. at 1543-44.
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nual meeting, however, in a surprising vote taken after only an hour
of debate on the topic, the ABA delegates voted 314 to 106 to support
an anti-MDP resolution jointly sponsored by New York, New Jersey,
Illinois, Florida and Ohio (New York et al.), effectively reinforcing the
Association's stance against fee sharing and lawyers partnering with
nonlawyers. 25
Although MDP proponents consider the ABA's affirmation of the
status quo regarding Rule 5.4 a setback, the controversy is far from
resolved. 24
 Opponents of MDPs feel the delegates vote will reverse the
recent momentum toward MDPs. 25 MDP advocates, however, indicate
that the MDP lobby will simply shift its efforts to the local and state
bar associations." Regardless of the ABA's July 2000 vote, the decision
regarding MDPs is ultimately the task of the individual state legisla-
tures responsible for promulgating state rules of professional respon-
sibility—although the ABA's position on such matters is given great
weight.27 Currently, there is little consensus among local and state bar
associations on the topic.28 Further, many states have initiated their
own investigations that are presently in various stages of completion. 29
This Note asserts that considering a change to Rule 5.4 that must
apply uniformly to all law firms, regardless of size, is not in the best
interest of the majority of the legal profession—small firms and solo
practitioners. 3° The Note further argues that recent actions by the
ABA to disband its Commission on Multidisciplinary Practices are
shortsighted and irresponsible, because evidence clearly establishes
that the issue is by no means settled." Part I reviews the arguments
both for and against MDPs and examines the ABA Commission's
" See Wendy Davis, MDP Overwhelmingly Rejected, 3 to 1 Vote Affirms Legal Profession's Core
Values, N.Y.LJ., July 12,2000, at 1.
" See, e.g., Covaleski, supra note 9, at 1; Sheryle Stratton & Lee A. Sheppard, American
Bar Association Says No to Multidisciplinary Practice, TAX NcrrEs, July 17,2000, at 311-16.
° See Covaleski, supra note 9, at 1.
" See id.
27 See id.
2g See id.; see also American Bar Association, MDP Report on State Positions, 1 [hereinafter
MOP Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstats.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2001).
29 See MDP Report, supra note 28, at 1. Twenty-three states have appointed committees,
but the committees have not yet returned reports. Ten states have appointed committees
that have returned reports but have taken no action on the reports. Three states have
taken favorable action on committee reports in favor of MDPs. Nine states have taken ac-
tion against change based on anti-MDP findings. Only four states have not appointed
committees as of thefuly 2000 ABA annual meeting. See id.
30 See infra notes 200-226 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 255-265 and accompanying text.
2001]	 Multidisciplinary Practices and Model Rule 5.4	 1165
findings and recommendations." Part II outlines the ethical and eco-
nomic considerations regarding MDPs. 33 Part III considers whether
other professions, primarily Big Five accounting firms, could adopt
the legal profession's firm wide imputation of a conflicts of interest
standard.34 Part IV argues that a change to Rule 5.4 need not apply
uniformly to all law firms; rather,, a change to the rule allowing MDPs
in only small firm and solo practitioner environments is a possible
alternative and would greatly benefit such practitioners and their cli-
ents.35 Part IV further argues that even if small firms are permitted to
practice in a multidisciplinary setting, such firms should never be
permitted to partner with public auditing firms." Finally, Part V pro-
poses that regardless of the ABA'S vote not to modify Rule 5.4, lawyers
and nonlawyers will continue to integrate legal and nonlegal profes-
sions, clearly demonstrating that the ABA must either continue to
consider modifications to Rule 5.4 or more persistently identify and
prosecute the illegal practice of law. 37
I. BACKGROUND
A. Proponents' Views Regarding MDPs
Most arguments in favor of MDPs focus on improving client serv-
ice and providing more diverse choices to the ultimate consumer of
legal services. 38 The fast paced and ever changing global marketplace
requires firms to have the capability to access a wide array of disci-
plines—globally, regionally and locally—which may affect a client's
business. 39 Arguably, law firms with their current structure do not
have the capability to meet these client demands.° Most of the
benefits mentioned above have been described in a phrase adopted
32 See infra notes 38-131 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 132-199 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 200-226 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 227-253 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 254-265 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 254-265 and accompanying text.
33 See New York State Bar Association Report of Special Committee on Multi Disciplinary Practice
and The Legal Profession, 10 [hereinafter New York State Bar Repast], available at
http://www.nysba.org/multidiscrpt.html#  (last visited Nov. 20, 2000); see also Lowell J.
Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1378-79
(2000).
39 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 10-11.
40 See id.
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by MDP proponents—"one-stop shopping. "41
 The core of this concept
is that offering clients the option of going to one professional services
firm for all of their professional needs will provide advantages in
efficiency, timeliness, coordination and, ultimately, cost to the con-
sumer.42
in addition to efficiency savings, proponents contend that MDPs
will offer clients better quality of service since one organization will be
able to address. not only clients' legal needs, but their business and
financial concerns as well.° This ability to use only one firm for an
entire issue or transaction will also provide the client a higher degree
of trust and confidence that all aspects of the transaction will be un-
derstood and handled appropriately."
Proponents further contend that the speed with which attorneys
respond to client issues can be greatly enhanced with the formation
of MDPs.° Today, many law firms have merged and expanded to build
larger networks, but they are still no match when compared to ac-
counting firms, which enjoy considerably greater scope and breadth.°
These accounting firms have a ready access to technology, human re-
sources and information throughout the nation and around the world
in ways that U.S. law firms cannot match 47
 The Big Five firms have
offices and resources in almost every major city in the United States
and around the world. 48
 This allows accounting firms to serve client
needs more quickly and effectively in today's global marketplace. 49
MDP supporters argue that giving attorneys access to this vast network
can only improve the services they provide, expanding their role in
representing their clients and broadening the . skill set of the attor-
neys—especially within small firms and solo practitioner settings. 5°
The views of small firms and solo practitioners concerning the
MDP debate are split, as evidenced by testimony before the Commis-
41 See id. at 10; see also Noteboom, supra note 38, at 1393-94.
42
 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 11.
45 see id,
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
41
 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 11. Due to the size of Big Five firms,
advantages stem from their resources, including intellectual capital on a seemingly endless
list of topics, technological advances, and access to their solid base of Fortune 500 audit
clients. See id.
" See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers website, at http://www.pwcglobal.com .
49
 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 11.
I" See id.
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sion.51 The small firms and solo practitioners opposed to MDPs con-
tinue to focus on the threat to the core values of the legal profes-
sion.52 Those in favor of MDPs have been able to point to specific
benefits their practices will receive by embracing MDPs. 55 In their
opinion, allowing a solo practitioner or a small firm to share fees and
partner with nonlawyer professionals will enhance their ability to
serve individuals in their communities through more effective and
cost-efficient representation. 64
For example, Philip Stinson, a Principal in the Philadelphia-
based law firm of Stinson Law Associates, P.C., testified before the
Commission in support of MDPs. 65 Mr. Stinson's firm has four attor-
neys in two offices dedicated to representing the needs of parents
with disabled children in special education matters, disability rights
litigation and disputes involving health care insurance providers and
the care of chronically ill children. 56 Mr. Stinson testified that he is
confronted with multidisciplinary interactions on a daily basis, fre-
quently in his representation of exceptional children at special educa-
tion due process hearings. 57 Representation of such children requires
the coordination of many professionals, most importantly lawyers and
clinical psychologists." Under current professional responsibility
rules, Mr. Stinson's firm is required to maintain an arm's-length rela-
tionship with the psychologists with whom it works side-by-side on be-
half of its clients." Mr. Stinson believes his firm would best be able to
provide legal services if he were permitted to join forces with the
clinical psychologists who are an integral part of the team advocating
on the child's behalf." He added that he intended to expand Stinson
Law Associates, P.C. over the next year by opening three more offices
51 See Written Testimony of L. Kent Abney, MDP Hearings, 1 (Oct. 1999), available at
http://www.abaiiet.org/cpr/abney1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2000); Written Testimony of
Robert L. Ostertag MDP Hearings, 1-6 (Oct. ,1999) thereinafter Ostertag Testimony], available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ostertag.turn1  (last visited Nov. 14, 2000); Statement of Philip
Stinson, MDP Hearings, 1-3 (Oct. 1999) thereinafter Stinson Statement], available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/stinson.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
52 See infra notes 124-197 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Stinson Statement, supra note 51, at 1-3.
55 See id.
55 See id. The Commission conducted these hearings in an effort to study the MDP is-
sue and draft its recommendation to the ABA House Delegates. See id.
See id.
53 See id.
55 See Stinson Statement, supra note 51, at ,1-3.
59 See id.
55 See id.
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across the country. 61
 He believes, however, that this will only be
financially feasible if the firm is able to deliver legal services in a mul-
tidisciplinary environment. 62
In addition to small firm lawyers, owners of small businesses and
those prominent in the small business community testified before the
Commission to express their support of MDPs." These individuals
noted that small businesses occupy an important place in the global
economy and have been integral to the U.S. economy's recent pros-
perity." George Abbott, the owner of a small business that provides
materials handling consulting and implementation services, has been
active in the small business community and has held numerous lead-
ership positions in several national organizations, including the Na-
tional Family Business Council, the National Small Business Associa-
tion and National Small Business United.° Mr. Abbott presented
statistics during his testimony indicating that small businesses "repre-
sent over ninety-nine percent of all employers, employ fifty-two •per-
cent of private workers, provide the overwhelming majority of all new
jobs and account for fifty-one percent of the private sector output." 66
In his support for MDPs, he noted such arrangements would provide
small business owners three advantages integral to their success:
choice, convenience and cost-effectiveness. 67
Furthermore, Mr. Abbott testified that no two small businesses
are alike and that the ability to choose the arrangement that works
best for their particular needs is vital to the success of any new ven-
tures." Beyond choice, many small business owners struggle to find
enough time in the day to do everything necessary to stay afloat. 69
 Be-
ing required to juggle meetings with different firms to talk with
financial planners, lawyers, accountants, public relations specialists
and advertising experts is a daunting task that leaves little time to fo-
cus on more important matters such as day-to-day operations and
business expansion." Mr. Abbott contended that by housing different
" See id.
92 See id.
63 See, e.g., Statement of George Abbott, MDP Hearings, 1 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Abbott
Statement], available at http://wivw.abanet.org/cpriabbotchtml
 (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
" See id.
66 See id.
66 Id.
67 See id.
66
 ,See Abbott Statement, supra note 63, at 1-2.
69
 See id. at 2.
76 See id.
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professionals in one firm, small business owners could receive coordi-
nated advice from a team of integrated professionals all working to-
gether to meet the client's particular needs."
Finally, Mr. Abbott testified that small business owners believe
MDPs will be a more cost-effective method of obtaining professional
services. 72 They believe that hiring separate professionals for advice
removes the opportunity for volume discounts or package pricing
thereby increasing the overall cost." In addition, many small business
owners contend that getting each separate firm up to speed regarding
their particular needs is inefficient, thus adding to the overall cost of
the services." Mr. Abbott testified that his experience indicates many
small businesses go without proper professional advice due to the
perceived cost, the inconvenience and, in some cases, the inability to
integrate the input from various advisors, and the feeling that they
have no control over the costs that they will incur." Mr. Abbott force-
fully argued that these problems could be remedied in an MDP envi-
ronment."
B. ABA MDP Commission's Findings and Recommendation
In 1999, the Commission conducted five days of open hearings
and met in executive sessions on three occasions." Forty-two witnesses
testified, and a significant number of interested persons submitted
written comments." The ABA Taxation Section and the ABA General
Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section formally endorsed the concept
of MDPs.79 In an effort to get additional information and feedback,
the Commission published five potential MDP models. 80 The Com-
mission did not endorse any one model, but used the results of the
feedback to help shape its initial recommendation. 81
71 See id.
72 See id. at 3.
75 See Abbott Statement, supra note 63, at 3.
74 See id.
75 See id.
75 See id.
77 See generally American Bar Association, Multidisciplinary Practice Commission—Hy-
potheticals and Models, 1 [hereinafter Hypotheticals and Models), available at lutp://www.
abanet.org/cpr/multiconaltypos.html (last visited Nov. 14,2000).
75 See id.
" See id.
80 See id. at 2-7.
81 See id. at 1.
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The Cooperative Model" retains the status quo with no changes
to the current Rule 5.4.82
 Under this model, prohibitions against shar-
ing fees and partnering with nonlawyers would continue, and lawyers
would be free to employ nonlawyer professionals to assist them in ad-
vising their clients." Any lawyer employing a nonlawyer professional
must take steps to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer, especially with respect
to the obligation not to disclose information relating to the represen-
tation and the protection of work product."
"The Command and Control Model" is based on the amended
Rule 5.4 currently adopted by the District of Columbia. 85
 The Wash-
ington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct permit a lawyer to form a
partnership with a nonlawyer and to share legal fees subject to certain
restrictions.86
 These restrictions indicate the law firm or organization
must have "as its sole purpose" the providing of legal services to oth-
ers.87
 The nonlawyer must agree "to abide by these rules of profes-
sional conduct," and any lawyer with a financial interest or managerial
authority must "undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer par-
ticipants to the same extent as if the nonlawyer participants were law-
yers under Rule 5.1."88
 Therefore, any nonlawyer professional partici-
pating in an MDP in the District of Columbia is subject to the lawyers'
rules of professional conduct, including Rule 1.6 on confidentiality of
information and Rules 1.7-1.10 on conflicts of interest. 89
As members of such an MDP, nonlegal professionals could not
provide their services, like accounting or financial planning, to any-
one except in connection with the offering of legal services. 90 Other
significant issues raised by this model have not been addressed by the
Commission 9'
 For example, it is clear that nonlawyer professionals
operating in an MDP environment will be subject to the ethical rules
82
 See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 77.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85
 See id. at 1
°a See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT V-3 (D.C. 1990).
87 See id.
88 Id. Rule 5.1 indicates that a partner in a law firm will make reasonable efforts to en-
sure all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct and that a lawyer
shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the rules of professional conduct if
such lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct of the other lawyer or has direct supervisory
responsibility over the lawyer. See id.
88
 See Hypoiheticals and Models, supra note 77, at 3.
" See id.
91 See id.
20011	 Multidisciplinary Practices and Model Rule 5.4 	 1171
of their respective professions, but, whether and to what extent the
MDP and the nonlawyers' independent practices should be treated as
a single entity for conflict of interest and imputation purposes (i.e.,
subject to lawyers' ethical standards) has yet to be determined.92
"The Ancillary Business Model" represents a situation by which a
lawyer operates a secondary business that provides professional serv-
ices other than legal services to clients." This model conforms to
Rule 5.7 concerning the responsibilities of lawyers regarding law-
related services." Rule 5.7 indicates that a lawyer will be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to law-related services "if
the law-related services are provided, (1) by the lawyer in circum-
stances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal serv-
ices to clients; or (2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer in-
dividually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures
to assure that a person obtaining law-related services knows that the
services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the pro-
tections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist: 96 This model
permits lawyers and nonlawyer professionals to partner in an ancillary
business, sharing fees and jointly making management decisions, pro-
vided that the clients of the ancillary business understand that the
services offered are distinct from the law firm and the ancillary busi-
ness does not offer legal services.96 The lawyer partners provide con-
sulting services, not legal services, to the clients of the ancillary busi-
ness; some, but not all, of the clients of the ancillary business may also
be clients of the law firm and vice versa. 97 The Commission recog-
nized that this model raises imputation and conflict of interest issues
similar to those of model two that have yet to be resolved."
"The Contract Model" involves a professional services firm con-
tracting with an independent law firm under various terms." Typical
contract terms include the following; first, the law firm agrees to iden-
tify its affiliation with the professional services firm on its letterhead,
business cards and in its advertising; 1" second, the law firm and pro-
fessional services firm agree to refer clients to each other (either on
99 See a
93 See id. at 4.
94 See PROVE. RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 13, at 96.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 77, at 4.
" See id.
99 See id. at 5.
199 See id.
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an exclusive or nonexclusive basis); 101 finally, the law firm agrees to
purchase goods and services from the professional services firm.'" In
this model, the law firm would remain a separate entity controlled
and managed by lawyers, and would only be able to accept clients who
had no connection to the affiliated professional services firm.'"
"The Fully Integrated Model" envisions an environment in which
there is no free-standing law firm—a true MDP.'" This model assumes
one professional services firm with separate organizational units (e.g.,
accounting, business consulting, legal services, etc.) advertising that it
provides a "seamless web" of services. 105
 Clients may either retain legal
services only, without ever utilizing the other services of the. organiza-
tion, or the legal and nonlegal services may be provided in connec-
tion with the same matter or different matters.'" The fully integrated
model, however, has the same conflict of interest and imputation is-
sues of the previous models, including additional problems regarding
confidentiality.m
In August 1999, after a number of hearings and meetings held
around the country, and in consideration of the feedback obtained
from the models described above, the Commission released the re-
sults of its study concluding that with the appropriate safeguards a
lawyer can deliver legal services in an MDP without endangering the
core values of the legal profession.'"
The Commission identified the core values of the legal profes-
sion as professional independence of judgment, the protection of
101 See id.
102 See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 77, at 5.
103 See id,
104
	 id. at 6.
105 See id.
K16 See id.
107 See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 77, at 6.
108
 In its 1999 report, the Commission concluded:
[T] hat with the appropriate safeguards a lawyer can deliver legal services to
the clients of an MDI' without endangering the core values of the legal pro-
fession or the interests they are designed to protect. The opportunity to struc-
ture a new vehicle for the delivery of legal services should be available to the
lawyers who express an interest in providing those services to their clients
through an MDI' and to those clients who express an interest in additional
choices of legal service providers. There is, of course, no assurance that law-
yers will choose to practice in MDPs or that clients will prefer to purchase le-
gal services from such providers.
1999 Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report, 5-6, available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mdpreport.html
 (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
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confidential client information and loyalty to the client through the
avoidance of conflict of interests:109 The Commission believed that
"appropriate safeguards" could be developed to protect the core val-
ues in conjunction with lifting the ban on fee sharing and partnering
with nonlawyers (or entities comprised of nonlawyers)."° The "ap-
propriate safeguards" identified by the Commission in its formal rec-
ommendation to the ABA in July 1999 require an MDP to provide a
letter to the state's highest court signed by the chief executive officer
of the MDP stating:
The MDP will not interfere with a lawyer's independent pro-
fessional judgment and will establish procedures to protect
such independent judgment;
The MDP will establish procedures to segregate client funds
as required by the legal profession;
All members of the MDP providing/assisting in the delivery
of legal services will abide by the lawyer's/legal rules of pro-
fessional conduct;
The MDP will acknowledge the lawyers' unique role in soci-
ety and in the administration of justice including rendering
pro bono publico services;
The MDP will annually review all above procedures for effec-
tiveness and amend as needed; and
The MDP will file a certification annually with the appropri-
ate court and permit the court to conduct audits of the MDP
while bearing the costs of any such audits."'
The Commission ended its recommendation with a provision indicat-
ing that failure to comply with the safeguards described above would
result in either a withdrawal of the MDP's authorization to deliver le-
gal services or "other appropriate remedial measures as ordered by
the court."112
The Commission presented the ABA with its initial recommenda-
tion at the ABA's 1999 annual meeting.' 15 The ABA decided not to
adopt the Commission's recommendation at that time, indicating it
1°9 See id. at 2.
no See id.
ill ABA Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to House Delegates, Recommenda-
tion, 2-3 [hereinafter Report to House Delegates], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
tndprecommendation.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
See id.
us See Stein, supra note 1, at 1543.
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wanted additional time to digest the proposal and findings so as to
make a more informed decision. 114
 The Commission continued its
efforts over the next year and prepared a modified recommendation
that was presented to the ABA at its 2000 annual meeting in july. 116
The Commission's 2000 MDP recommendation appeared to be a
watered down version of its 1999 recommendation, having removed
much of the detail of the 1999 recommendation. 116
 Specifically, one
of the critical areas scaled back was the Commission's recommenda-
tions regarding MDP regulation; the 2000 recommendation removed
all language and detailed procedures regarding regulation of
MDPs. 117
 Instead of providing a detailed suggestion to jurisdictions
considering a change to their rules to permit MDPs, the Commission
simply stated, "regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules
and adopt such additional enforcement procedures as are needed to
implement these principles and to protect the public interest."118 The
Report accompanying the recommendation stated that the detailed
regulatory scheme provided in the 1999 recommendation was ex-
cluded from its 2000 recommendation due to significant criticism re-
ceived by the Commission describing its regulatory scheme as un-
workable.119
 Rather than spending the year researching and
developing a more workable regulation scheme, the Commission ap-
pears to have passed on the issue, leaving it to the local jurisdictions
to solve the enforcement problem if those jurisdictions decide to
amend their rules of professional conduct to allow MDPs. 12°
After removing much of the detail from the initial draft, the
Commission presented its revised recommendation at the ABA's 2000
annual meeting but urged the House Delegates to consider postpon-
ing any action concerning MDPs until the 2001 mid-year ABA meet-
ing, since many of the states had not yet completed their own studies
concerning the MDP issue. 121
 The House Delegates ignored the
Commission's suggestion and, after only an hour of debate, voted to
adopt the recommendation by New York et al. that Rule 5.4 be left
114 See id. at 1543-44.
115
 See generally ABA Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House Dele-
gates, 1, 9 [hereinafter Report to House Delegates Ill , available at http:/ /ww,v.abanet.org/ cpr/
mdplinalrep2000.1itml (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
118 Str id. at 1.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 See id. at 7.
126
	 Report to House Delegates II, supra note 115, at 7.
121 See id. at 2.
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intact, rejecting the Commission's recommendation and discharging
the Commission, thereby ending any additional discussion on the sub-
ject. 122 Prior to the adoption of the New York et al. recommendation,
the debate at the July 2000 annual meeting primarily focused on a
need to bring the issue of MDPs to a close. 125 The proponents of the
New York et al. recommendation argued for closure on the issue,
claiming the profession was vulnerable every day the issue remained
unresolved, but never articulating the nature and scope of this vul-
nerability. 124 Nevertheless, the New York et al. recommendation
passed. 125
C. New York et al. and Its Opposing View
Recommendation 10F (10F), adopted by the ABA at its 2000 an-
nual meeting, was based upon the insights gained and the positions
adopted by the New York MDP commission appointed by the New
York State Bar Association and headed by the former ABA President
Robert MacCrate.126 Recommendation 1OF has several parts, but basi-
cally called for an end to the debate over modification to Rule 5.4 and
an end to the Commission's work. 127 First, 1OF stated that it is in the
public interest to preserve the core values of the legal profession, and
went on to identify those core values as:
(1) undivided loyalty to the client,
(2) duty to exercise independent legal judgment for the
benefit of the client,
(3) duty to hold client confidences inviolate,
(4) duty to avoid conflicts of interests with clients,
(5) duty to help maintain a single profession of law with
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice, and
1 " See ABA Recommendation, 1-2 [hereinafter ABA Recommendation], available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecom10F.htmi (last visited Nov. 26, 2000).
1" See Unedited Tinnscript, House Delegates Annual Meeting, 1 -12 (July 11, 2000) [herein-
after Unedited Dansaiptl, available at http://www.abanet.org/cprimdp_hod_transc.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2000).
1 " See id.
125 See ABA Recommendation, supra note 122, at 1 -2; see also Unedited nanscript, supra note
123, at 10.
126 See generally American Bar Association, MDP Report 10F, 1, available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mdp-reportl0f.html (last visited Nov, 14, 2001).
127 See ABA Recommendation, supra note 122, at 1 -2.
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(6) duty to promote access to justice. 128
Next, 1OF asked all jurisdictions to reevaluate and redefine the
definition of the "practice of law," encouraging all jurisdictions to re-
tain and enforce laws that bar the practice of law by entities other
than law firms. 129
 More specifically, 1OF stated that the sharing of legal
fees and the control and ownership of the practice of law with non-
lawyers is inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession,
thus laws prohibiting such arrangements should not be revised.'" Fi-
nally, 1OF called for the Commission to be discharged. 131
H. ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING MOPS,
INCLUDING A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Traditional Professional Independence—Different Views and Expectations
The legal profession has long praised its traditional requirement
of professional independence designed to protect the public interest
by assuring that the attorney is free to exercise professional judgment
without outside influences. 132
 Many attorneys who oppose MDPs feel
that allowing nonlawyer professionals into the system will threaten
this professional independence. 153
 These concerns primarily focus on
issues relating to nonlawyer control over work that can be termed the
"practice of law."134
 If nonlawyers become the primary "rainmakers"
or if they bill the most hours, they could have greater influence over a
firm's policies than the lawyers. 135 Over time, opponents argue, this
influence by nonlawyer professionals will affect other segments of the
legal profession, like the judiciary, diluting the values and social
commitments traditionally associated with the legal profession.'"
Opponents also express their concern that nonlawyer profession-
als have not been exposed to or instilled with the traditions and values
of the legal profession, and that they are not subject to the same dis-
125
 See id. at 1.
1" See id. at 2.
in See id.
131 See id.
132 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 12-13.
I" See Harold Levinson, No: Keep the Profession Distinctive, A.BA. J., May 1990, at 39.
134 See id.
133 See id.
136
 See id.
2001]	 Multidisciplinary Practices and Model Rule 5.4	 1177
ciplinary system governing those in the legal profession.' 37 Absent
immersion in the traditions and values of the legal profession, non-
lawyer professionals have not undertaken the societal obligations in-
herent in the legal profession. 138 These obligations include participa-
tion• in "the constant improvement of society's legal system" and a
responsibility "to make that system readily accessible to society. "139
Concerns center, for example, on the possibility that a nonlawyer
manager, who has not grown up in a culture that emphasizes the im-
portance of affording every individual access to the legal system, may
declare that no time be spent on pro bono publico services. 149
Many MDP proponents argue that the legal pressures from non-
lawyer managers to betray legal traditions and values (in addition to
ethical guidelines) would be no greater than the current pressure
from lawyer managers within firms. 141 In addition, nonlawyer profes-
sionals have attacked attorneys for acting in an elitist manner by con-
tending that only lawyers, and not other professionals, can hold them-
selves to high ethical standards. 142
B. Confidentiality—May Be Waived in MDP Environments
Opponents of MDPs agree that altering the Model Rules to allow
MDPs would create significant confusion surrounding the
confidentiality of client information and the attorney-client privi-
lege. 14S This possible confusion has been found to have the potential
to lead to a weakening of the public's confidence in the privi-
lege/confidentiality, thereby thwarting its important purpose, which is
to encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of jus-
tice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or ad-
vocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy
137 See Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, The Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our
Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097,
1103-04 (2000).
I" See Levinson, supra note 133, at 39.
159 Id.
110 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 13.
141 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1103.
us See Stratton & Sheppard, supra note 24, at 313.
149 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1106; Stein, supra note 1, at 1542-93; Bernard Wolf-
man February 2000 Hearing Testimony on MDP, 1 [hereinafter WoOnan Testimony], available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wolfinan4.htm1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
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depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed tly the cli-
ent.'"
Currently, Model Rule 1.6 will only permit revelation of a client
communication by an attorney to prevent the client from committing
a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer "believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to
the financial interest or property of another."1 ' Confidentiality, how-
ever, may be lost for any information the client gives the lawyer in the
presence of third persons unconnected with the representation.'"
This is where potential problems in an MDP environment arise. For
example, if there are multiple professionals within a firm serving a
client with multiple issues (some legal, some financial, etc.), the client
may be uncertain when the privilege applies. 147
 Opponents worry that
this confusion will lead to inadvertent breaches of confidentiality and
privilege damaging to the client and the attorney's reputation.'" It
may also lead clients to withhold information from their attorneys
that may be vital to providing the best, or even adequate, representa-
tion. 149
The Commission's 2000 recommendation places the burden on
lawyers participating in an MDP to ensure that other professionals
within the MDP protect confidentiality.'" Many opponents feel this is
an unrealistic burden to place on a lawyer in a large organization
comprised of hundreds or thousands of nonlawyers."' Some advo-
cates have gone further, claiming that the privilege should only run
between the client and the respective attorney and not the MDP. 152 All
those opposed to MDPs agree that such a narrow construction of
confidentiality and privilege would certainly aid in the formation of
MDPs, but would also lead to a destruction of the entire concept.'"
Opponents contend that such a narrow view of confidentiality will
144
 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981).
146 See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 13, at 21.
146 See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 25
(1998).
147
 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1106; Stein, supra note 1, at 1542-43.
148 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1106; Stein, supra note 1, at 1542-43.
146
 See Paper Presented by Gary Johnson re MDP, 2-3 [hereinafter Johnson Paper], available
at Intp://www.abanet.org/cpr/johnson2.html
 (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
150 See id.
181 See id. at 3.
162 See id.
193 See id.
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clog the free flow of information that the Supreme Court itself has
indicated as critical to the effective representation of clients. 154
Beyond the potential issues that arise with "generic" nonlawyer
professionals in an MDP environment, and due to the Big Five's
significant role in the pro-MDP movement, many anti-MDP lawyers
have stressed the direct conflict between a lawyer's confidentiality ob-
ligation and a public auditor's duty to publicly disclose. 155 Opponents
are quick to point out that lawyers and public auditors have different
obligations and duties to their clients and to the public. 156 For exam-
ple, auditors have an obligation to report their conclusions, not only
to their client, but also to the public. 157 Public auditors who have
failed to fully disclose information they had in their possession have
often been sued for malpractice. 158 Lawyers, however, are ethically
bound to represent only the interests of their clients (within the limits
of the law) and have a duty not to reveal client confidences to the
public.'" James Moore, a partner at Harter, Secrest & Emery in Roch-
ester, New York and past president of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion, articulated the potential conflict in his speech at the Pace Law
Review Symposium on MDPs in the fall of 1999: "One could easily
imagine circumstances which might confront a lawyer in an MDP who
might acquire knowledge about a client which he or she would regard
as confidential, but which his or her accountant partner might feel
obliged to disclose publicly." 158
MDP opponents are quick to point out that even the Big Five are
taking notice of this conflict surrounding confidentiality principles
and have recently taken drastic steps in order to safeguard the MDP
concept and abide by recent SEC announcements concerning
conflicts of interest. 161 For example, on February 16, 2000, it was re-
ported that PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was splitting off its tax
and auditing work from its other consulting businesses, which in turn
154 See Johnson Paper, supra note 149, at 3.
155 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1106; James C. Moore, Lawyers and Accountants: Is the
Delivery of Legal Services Through the Multidisciplinary Practice in the Best Interests of Clients and
the Public?, 20 PACE L. REV. 33, 37-38 (1999); Stein, supra note 1, at 1242-43.
156 See Moore, supra note 155, at 37-38.
117 See 2 AICPA PROF'L STANDARDS 4581, 4671 (1996).
155 See Moore, supra note 155, at 38.
16° See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 13, at 21.
16° Moore, supra note 155, at 38.
161 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1104-05.
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might be split into two or more additional entities. 162 Shortly after
PwC's announcement, Ernst & Young announced it would be selling
its non-audit business to Gemini S.A. of France.'" These strategic ma-
neuvers are also an effort to reduce the many conflicts of interest that
can (and have) arisen concerning the integration of legal work with
accounting—particularly the attestation function.'"
C. Loyalty—Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest
The Model Rules currently require the imputation of conflicts of
interest to all members of a law firm) Therefore, if any one member
of a firm has a conflict with a client of the firm, regardless of whether
he is working for that specific client, Rule 1.10 indicates the entire
firm has a conflict and shall not represent the entity.'" Accounting
firms, however, only require the conflict be imputed to members'of a
particular team serving the specific client, thus conflicts within a firm
can exist as long as the individual(s) with the conflict is not providing
any service to the respective client.' 87 Supporters of MDPs are dis-
pleased by the legal profession's firmwide imputation requirement
and consider it a major stumbling block in the successful transition to
MDPs. 168
The Big Five were permitted to grow to their current size due, in
large part, to the relaxed imputation rules governing their profes-
sion. 169
 Without such relaxation, the Big Five would have been forced
to turn down a significant amount of business. 178 Supporters of MDPs
describe "firewalls" used by the Big Five as a mechanism that may be
I 62 See Elizabeth MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopers Will Divide into Two or More Parts,
Under Pressure, WALL ST, J., Feb. 18, 2000, at B8; see also Elizabeth MacDonald, Pricewater-
houseCoopers Nears Plan for Restructuring Involving Split or Sale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2000, at
C11.
163 See John Tagliabue, Cap. Gemini to Acquire Ernst Ev' Young's Consulting Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Cl.
184 See infra notes 171-192 and accompanying text.
105 SeePROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, Slipra note 13, at 42.
1 °8 See id. Rule 1.10 (a) operates from the "premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially
one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise
that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with
whom the lawyer is associated." See id.
167 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1101; see also Brian Caswell & Catherine Allen, The En-
gagement Team Approach to Independence, J. of ACCT., Feb. 2001, at 57 (noting movement
from "firm-based rules concerning independence to an engagement-team approach" re-
laxes the independence requirements even further).
168 See Johnson Paper, supra note 149, at 3.
169 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1101.
170 See id.
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used for the successful relaxation of the legal imputation standard to
smooth the transition to MDPs.' 7' These firewalls serve as a means to
allow the same firm to represent two conflicting parties simultane-
ously by separating the two teams that are working on conflicting mat-
ters, sometimes within the same office and sometimes geographi-
cally.'" While proponents point to the success of firewalls, many
lawyers who oppose MDPs are concerned with the self-governance of
such a mechanism in light of recent SEC findings regarding auditor
independence at PwC. 1 " The report indicated that half of the part-
ners of PwC, including thirty-one top executives, had violated the
auditor independence rules prohibiting investment in audit clients of
the firm. 174 A total of 1,885 staffers committed a total of 8,064 viola-
tions—forty-five percent of the infractions were carried out by part-
ners who audit public companies.'" The SEC suggested that fifty-two
companies hire another audit firm to replace PwC in an effort to alle-
viate the independence problems.'"
The dismissive nature of PwC's reaction to the investigation con-
cerned many MDP opponents.'" PwC's Chairman, Nicholas Moore,
and PwC's Chief Executive Officer, James Schiro, stated, "the vast ma-
jority of [the] infractions resulted from an honest failure to appreci-
ate the importance of compliance, failure to check restricted invest-
ments, and a lack of understanding of the intricacies of the rules."'"
MDP opponents argue that if accounting firms cannot be trusted to
police their own watered-down imputation rules, there is no way they
can be expected to abide by the legal community's firmwide imputa-
tion of conflicts requirement)" Rather, the accounting firms will con-
tinue to seek to change the imputation requirement—a move that
opponents contend will have disastrous results for the legal commu-
nity and its clients. 180 Bernard Wolfman, Fessenden Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School, in his testimony to the Commission, discussed
171 See New York State Bar Report, supra note 38, at 24.
172 see id.
173 See Elizabeth MacDonald & Michael Schroeder, Report by SEC Says Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers Violated Rules on Conflicts of Interest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2000, at AS.
174 See id,
175 See id.
178 See Elizabeth MacDonald, Accountant Faces Salvo from SEC WALL Sr. J., Feb. 28, 2000,
at A3.
177 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1100.
178 MacDonald & Schroeder, supra note 173, at AS (quoting letter from Pricewater-
houseCoopers).
178 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1101.
180 See id.
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the above-mentioned violations of PwC and other accounting firms,
noting that the initial response from the firms was that the rules gov-
erning conflicts need to be changed."' A Big Five spokesman said
that the conflict rules governing ownership of stock of clients was
merely an SEC rule that had been rejected by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) at its introduction in 1931,
implying compliance was not important. 182 Mr. Wolfman suggested
that these immediate responses "should give serious pause to our en-
trusting the care and control of the legal profession to those who have
demonstrated such indifference to the law and such lack of fidelity to
long established ethical norms and values."183
In an addendum to his testimony, Mr. Wolfman noted that the
Council of the AICPA (analogous to the ABA House of Delegates) has
adopted a resolution that would mandate an MDP composed of prac-
ticing CPAs and lawyers to be at least fifty-one percent owned by
CPAs. 184
 In about twenty states, statutes have already been passed
which would impose the fifty-one percent CPA ownership require-
ment. 185 Opponents argue this is yet another clear sign that the future
control of the legal profession in an MDP environment will be out of
the hands of lawyers, with complete responsibility resting with non-
lawyer professionals to the detriment of society.I 86
D. Economic Considerations and Global Perspectives
Much of the debate surrounding the potential modification of
Rule 5.4 has focused on the significant economic considerations of
any change, specifically, those related to effects on clients.' 87 The
Commission heard significant testimony from small business owners
as well as from in-house counsel urging a change that would permit
lawyers and accountants to partner and act as one in an effort to pro-
vide more comprehensive service to their clients.I 88
181 See Wolfman Testimony, supra note 143, at 3.
182 See id.
183 Id.
"" See id. at 5.
lea See id.
188 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1100.
187 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 155, at 35-36; Noteboom, supra note 38, at 1392-96;
Burnele V. Powell, Flight from the Center: Is itJust orJust About Money?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1439,
1466-67 (2000); Wolfman Paper, supra note 143, at 2;Johnson Paper, supra note 149, at 2-3.
188 See Noteboom, supra note 38, at 1393-95.
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In addition to the testimony of business persons, proponents of
MDPs have frequently cited the success and growth of large MDP
practices in Europe as proof that accountants and lawyers can partner
without detrimental effects to society:1" Specifically, Laurel Terry,
Professor of Law at Pennsylvania State Dickinson School of Law, spent
a year studying MDPs in Germany where she noted that small MDPs,
particularly, operated quite effectively in the German marketplace.' 9°
Based on her study, Professor Terry recommends that the U.S. adopt
the Commission's "Fully Integrated Model" (Model Five) that would
not require a lawyer majority ownership/control or limitation of the
MDP to the provision of legal services.'"
While proponents have attempted to demonstrate the success of
European MDPs, opponents have pointed out weaknesses and un-
satisfied clients within the European community. 192 In his testimony
before the Commission, Professor Wolfman cited a comprehensive
survey of 350 of Britain's largest corporations that showed eighty-eight
percent of the corporations "do not want an amalgamation of their
now independent lawyers and accountants," a view expressed inde-
pendently by both the chief legal officers and chief financial
officers. 193 Wolfman went on to cite a report published by the Consul-
tative Organization of the Bar Organizations of the European Union
and other European States (CCBE) published in late 1999, which
noted problems with the current MDPs in Europe.'" The CCBE Re-
port concluded that problems inherent in the integration of lawyers
and nonlawyers could not be adequately overcome to permit lawyer
independence and client confidentiality. 195 The CCBE further noted
that the legal profession is a crucial and indispensable element in the
administration of justice and safeguarding its efficiency and integrity
is the "highest concern and priority," thus, the CCBE advised against
permitting forms of "integrated co-operation" between lawyers and
nonlawyers. 196
199 See Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547, 1623
(2000).
199 See id.
191 See id. at 1611-12 (even though the majority of MAPS in Germany are lawyer con-
trolled).
192 See, e.g., Woyman Testimony, supra note 143, at 2 (quoting a survey published in Lon-
don's Commercial Latleron June 21, 1998).
199 See id.
194 See id. at 4.
199 Id. (quoting CCBE Report from its Nov. 12, 1999 meeting in Athens, Greece).
199 See id.
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Proponents and the Commission have not focused on the above-
mentioned studies concerning European MDPs, rather, they have
chosen to focus their attention on a "somewhat less comprehensive"
survey published in a recent edition of the Financial Times. 197 This
survey indicates that two-thirds of the respondents oppose lawyer-
accountant MDPs, but fifty percent of the respondents said that if, in
order to keep their existing lawyers and accountants, they would have
to accept MDPs (if the two would merge), they would do so. 193 Oppo-
nents contend that the Commission has had plenty of time to conduct
its own comprehensive survey on the matter of client demand but has
not done so. 199
III. CONCERNS ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND CONFLICTS MET BY
CHARGES OF ELITISM
MDPs present a serious danger to the legal profession. 20° The re-
cent vote of the ABA's House of Delegates refusing to permit MDPs is
a clear demonstration of how concerned members of the bar truly
are.2°1
 The largest threat to the profession and opponents' strongest
arguments against MDPs relate to the potential compromises of
confidentiality and conflicts of interest that will inevitably arise in an
MDP environment.202
 Confidentiality allows clients to willingly divulge
all necessary (and sometimes damaging) facts regarding their repre-
sentation to allow the lawyer to present the best case for the client. 203
MDPs have the potential to create confusion about confidentiality,
leading to possible inadvertent breaches that could damage clients. 2"
This will only result in the slow erosion of the attorney-client relation-
ship, leading to an overall weakening of the legal system. 203
A. Can Accounting Firms Adopt the Legal Profession's Imputation of
Conflicts Standard?
There is no practical way that the Big Five, due to their enormous
size, can ever adopt the legal profession's requirement of imputation
197 See Wolfman Testimony, supra note 143, at 2.
122 See id.
199 See id.
203 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
402 See supra notes 132-186 and accompanying text.
2°' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
"4 See supra notes 143-164 and accompanying text.
406 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1097.
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of conflicts of interest to the entire firm, rather than merely to the
specific team members working on the client matter, as their current
rules dictate. 406 It is clear that currently the accounting firms cannot
even handle monitoring their limited conflict of interest require-
ments in a way that satisfies their own regulatory body, the SEC. 207
The role , of the public auditor is critical to the investing public and
should not be taken lightly. 2°8 For these reasons, any firm that pro-
vides attestation services to public companies should not be able to
practice law.2"
The lawyers' requirement of independence from outside
influences is essential to ensuring the client will receive adequate rep-
resentation.210 The direct conflict relating to the public auditor's duty
to disclose client activity to the public with the lawyer's duty to hold
client confidences is too great. 211 The SEC has spoken on the issue
and agrees that a public auditor's independence would be impaired if
their firm also provided legal services to a publicly traded company. 212
Further, recent Big Five conduct indicates an implicit acceptance of
this rationale as evidenced by the announced divestment by PwC of its
audit and tax practices and the sale by Ernst & Young of its non-audit
practice. 213
This conduct not only indicates an implicit agreement that
conflicts exist between attestation services and legal services, but may
also be perceived as a demonstration of where the Big Five's desires
lie. 214 The accounting firms were initially pushing for MDP authoriza-
tion from the ABA on the theory that they would be better able to
serve their clients in a one-stop-shopping environment. 215 After all the
criticism by MDP opponents and the announcement by the SEC
2" See supra notes 165-186 and accompanying text.
207 A SEC audit of PricewaterhouseCoopers revealed that half of the partners at the
firm had violated the conflict of interest standards by owning stock in the public compa-
nies they audited. See MacDonald & Schroeder, supra note 173, at A3.
2" See, e.g., Johnson Paper, supra note 149, at 6. After quoting SEC Commissioner Nor-
man S. Johnson and SEC's Director of Enforcement Richard H. Walker, both indicating
that attestation and advocacy services cannot be combined into one firm, Mr. Johnson
went on to say, "this is where the market trends of one-stop convenience and consolida-
tion run into a brick wall. Too much is at stake to permit this particular combination. Id.
2,19 See Wolfman Testimony, supra note 143, at 1.
21 ° See notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
ell See Fox, supra note 137, at 1102-03.
212 See id. at 1099-1100.
211 See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
214 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1104-06.
215 See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
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frowning upon auditor/lawyer MDPs, certain firms decided to aban-
don their long standing "bread and butter" audit and tax practices in
an effort to remove any conflicts standing in the way of an MDP envi-
ronment. 2l 8
 Such an abandonment of the one-stop-shopping theory
strongly signals a purely profit-driven motivation by the Big Five. 217 It
will be interesting and important to see how truly "separate" the audit
and tax practices actually become from the remaining practice areas
within the firm, particularly in light of the accounting firms' recent
lack of concern for their conflict of interest rules. 2l 8
B. Are MDP Opponents Elitist?
Many MDP opponents argue that nonlawyer professionals have
not been instilled with the values and traditions of the legal profes-
sion, which could lead to the erosion of the societal obligations in-
herent in the practice of law. 219
 MDP advocates have criticized this
view as an elitist position that wrongly assumes that only lawyers can
hold themselves to high ethical standards. 2" While at first appearance
it may look like an elitist position, opponents of MDPs are simply con-
cerned that nonlawyer managers in an MDP environment may be
more apt to violate the strict ethics requirements of the legal profes-
sion because they are not subject to the lawyers' disciplinary system
and thus cannot be held accountable for their actions.221
Unlike the lawyers' definition of loyalty, which accountants could
adopt if they truly committed to it, the definitions of professional in-
dependence utilized by lawyers and accountants only have one thing
in common, their names.222
 The accountant's independence is an in-
dependence from their client—they must bring a healthy skepticism
to their work to protect the public from relying on financial state-
ments that contain material misstatements.228
 The SEC has indicated
many times regarding auditors, "we want no advocates here, but
rather professional distance and objectivity." 224
 Lawyers, however, view
professional independence as an independence from outside
216 See supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
217
 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1104-06.
218 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1105; MacDonald & Schroeder, supra note 173, at A3.
219 See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
221 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1103.
222 See id. at 1102.
228 See id.
424 a
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influences (e.g., government, other clients, third parties, etc.). 225 This
independence from outside influences is essential to allowing a lawyer
to exercise "unbridled loyalty and zealous advocacy" in the represen-
tation of a client.226
IV. Do SMALL FIRMS AND SOLO PRACTITIONERS NEED PROTECTION
FROM MDPs?
Much of the opposition to MDPs has been directed at the Big
Five and has revolved around the size of the accounting fi rill S.227 Many
authors and commentators who oppose MDPs have implicitly indi-
cated that by advocating the continuation of the status quo regarding
Rule 5.4, they are not only stopping large firm MDPs but are also pro-
tecting the small firms and solo practitioners in the legal commu-
nity.225 By doing so, however, they may be ignoring the needs and de-
sires of lawyers practicing in the small firm or solo practitioner
environment. 229 Opponents have argued that should MDPs be permit-
ted, small firms and solo practitioners will be swallowed up by the
huge accounting/legal/consulting firms that will result. 25°
Such an outcome has been compared to the demise of the local
bookstore at the hands of Barnes & Noble or the local drugstore at
the hands of major drugstore chains such as CVS. 251 It seems doubt-
ful, however, that the Big Five will create their vast legal practice by
buying small firms and solo practitioners. Rather, the accounting
firms, which already dwarf the largest U.S. law practices, will attempt
to buy-out the top 100 U.S. law firms. These huge MDPs will not be
able—nor want—to serve the legal needs of all citizens, unlike Barnes
& Noble and CVS. They will primarily focus their attention on large,
complex legal matters. This will leave an important gap to be filled by
the already existing small firms and solo practitioners—serving the
individual and small corporate clients on small to medium-sized mat-
ters.
The assumption that a change to Rule 5.4 would have to apply
uniformly to all lawyers and nonlawyers in all practice environments is
narrow-minded, short-sighted, and may not be in the best interest of
225 See id. at 1102-03.
"6 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1103.
2e7 See, e.g., Wolfman Testimony, supra note 143, at 2.
2" See, e.g., Ostertag Testimony, supra note 51, at 2.
129 See, e.g., Abbott Statement, supra note 63, at 1.
2" See Ostertag Testimony, supra note 51, at 2.
2" See id.
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the majority of the legal profession or its clients. While the notion
that MDPs should not be permitted to operate in a large firm envi-
ronment, primarily due to confidentiality and conflict of interest
problems, is reasonable, the MDP environment can have extensive
benefits for small firms and solo practitioners. 232 More than sixty-
seven percent of lawyers in private practice in the United States prac-
tice in firms with six attorneys or fewer.233 Arguing that the Big Five
should be prevented from practicing law without specifically address-
ing the potential needs and desires of more than two-thirds of the le-
gal profession misses the point. 2M The ABA seems to have barred a
change to Rule 5.4 in an effort to prevent the Big Five from practicing
law—what appears to be a purely defensive maneuver—instead of de-
veloping their own solution to the changing economic landscape. 235
Problems surrounding independent professional judgment,
confidentiality and conflicts of interest, which are the primary focus
when discussing large firm MDPs, can more easily be solved in a small
firm environment.
None of the testimony before the Commission suggested any-
thing other than a uniform modification to the Model Rules. A re-
vised rule, however, could be drafted whereby small firms, but not
large ones, would be permitted to operate MDPs. In order for this
modification to be credibly made, the Commission would need to
conduct extensive research and determine the optimum number of
attorneys a firm may have whereby potential problems surrounding
professional judgment, confidentiality and conflicts of interest can be
easily mitigated. For the sake of further discussion, assume the opti-
mum number is ten or fewer. 2S6
Under this proposed regime, Rule 5.4 could be broken into two
sections. Section one could require attorneys practicing in firms with
eleven lawyers or more to be subject to existing Rule 5.4. Section two,
however, could indicate that attorneys who practice in a firm with ten
lawyers or fewer or operate as a sole practitioner may share legal fees
with a nonlawyer and form a partnership with a nonlawyer, subject to
the following:
"2 See, e.g., Abbott Statement, supra note 63, at 1; Stinson Statement, supra note 51, at 1-3.
"3 See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 25
(1994).
234 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
238 No empirical or statistical data were reviewed to arrive at this conclusion. The
number utilized above is for theoretical discussion only.
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(1) Conflicts of interest must be imputed to the entire
firm, both lawyers and nonlawyers;
(2) All partners/professionals, both lawyers and nonlaw-
yers, must adhere to both the legal and nonlegal ethical
standards as promulgated by the respective governing bodies
of the respective professions; 237
(3) Nonlawyer professionals who partner with lawyers
must register with the local bar and receive a certificate of
approval; and
(4) Lawyers must retain a majority ownership in the part-
nersh ip.238
The registration requirement in (3) above would also require a one-
time fee as well as annual dues in an effort to place the cost of the
program and compliance testing on the professionals." 9 Further, reg-
istering with local bar associations will enable 'the bar to enforce the
legal ethical standards on any nonlawyer professional who partners
with an attorney. Sanctions for violations may include censure and
revocation of the certificate of approval, preventing the nonlawyer
professional from partnering with attorneys in the future. Similar
sanctions may be levied against attorneys.
Critics could argue that too much responsibility for ensuring a
nonlawyer professional is certified to partner with a lawyer rests on
the lawyer. While this argument may have, merit, there is no clear
problem with a lawyer having significant responsibility to ensure
proper certification with the state bar association of a nonlawyer pro-
fessional with whom the lawyer would like to form a partnership. This
protective measure is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession, and any benefits small firms and solo practitioners receive
by a modification to the rules will not come without a corresponding
increase in responsibility for safeguarding the legal profession and its
clients.24°
2" The more restrictive standard will control in the event any conflicts between the le-
gal ethical standards and another professional standard exists.
2" See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text (providing suggested requirements
derived from Commission's two recommendations and testimony presented before the
Commission).
2" See Report to House Delegates, supra note 111, at 2-3 (fee associated with such regula-
tion was suggested by the Commission's initial recommendation to the House Delegates in
July, 1999).
2" See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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This proposed modification would enable lawyers in small firms
and solo practitioners to partner, for example, with certified public
accountants, certified financial advisors or certified financial planners
to provide more comprehensive service to individual clients. Numer-
ous other options would be open to such lawyers, including partner-
ing with PhDs, medical doctors or economists (to name only a few),
all to the benefit of small firm clients. As Philip Stinson testified be-
fore the Commission, his four-lawyer law practice dedicated to the
representation of parents with disabled children would benefit tre-
mendously from a modification to Rule 5.4.241 A rule change would
allow him to partner with the clinical psychologists he works
side-by-side with, allowing him to deliver higher quality and more cost
effective representation to his clients. 242
 Having these nonlawyer pro-
fessionals as members of his firm will allow Mr. Stinson to develop
closer relationships with the physicians and enable his clients to have
real time access to the individuals necessary for the case. 243 He further
testified that the only way he feels he can expand his practice is if a
change to the rules will allow him to partner with the physicians who
are integral to his practice. 2"
This partnering could be achieved with minimal, if any, problems
concerning lawyers' ethical obligations. By requiring lawyers to re-
main majority owners, any threat to lawyers' professional independent
judgment can be greatly minimized, if not eliminated. 243 Pressures on
MDP lawyers may develop from other non-legal areas of the partner-
ship, but with lawyers as majority owners, the ultimate decisions re-
garding legal and nonlegal representation will rest with the attor-
ney(s)—exactly where they should. 246 In addition, requiring lawyer
majorities and lawyer imputation rules will control the size of MDPs,
keeping them small, a factor that Professor Terry has indicated has
been important in the success of German MDPs.247
Further, conflicts of interest can easily be imputed to the entire
firm in a small practice without delaying client representation or risk-
ing serious undiscovered conflicts. Most representations undertaken
by small firms do not lend themselves to the types of potential
241 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
245 Bui see, e.g., Terry, supra note 189, at 1612-13,1623-24.
246 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1103.
247 See Terry, supra note 189, at 1623.
2001]	 Multidisciplinary Practices and Model Rule 3.4	 1191
conflicts experienced by large firms representing many large corpo-
rate clients. The possibility of two attorneys representing opposite
sides of the same matter without immediately becoming aware of the
conflict is extremely small, if not non-existent in a firm of ten or fewer
lawyers. Finally, any confusion surrounding client confidentiality can
be mitigated more easily in a small firm than in a firm the size of PwC,
for example. Clear instructions can be provided to a client concern-
ing confidentiality and proper steps can be taken by the attorney to
avoid any unintended breaches.
Beyond the desire for a favorable modification to Rule 5.4 by
small practitioners, small business owners have also testified in favor
of a rule change. 248 As George Abbott indicated in his testimony, small
businesses represent the largest percentage of employers in the coun-
try and would benefit by small firm MDPs through increased choice,
convenience and cost-effectiveness. 249 Any rule change should be un-
dertaken with the interests of the clients in mind, not just the interests
of law firms or accounting firms. Allowing large MDPs would not
benefit small businesses, because the bulk of legal work performed for
such businesses is done by small law firms—primarily due to cost re-
straintS. 250 A rule allowing small firm MDPs, however, would have an
immediate and direct impact in favor of the small business owner,
making a non-uniform modification to the Model Rules more favor-
able.251
Any revision to the Model Rules should specify, however, that a
lawyer is not, under any circumstances, permitted to partner with a
public auditor.252 The potential problems associated with
confidentiality and conflicts of interest are too great. 255 Allowing small
firms to operate MDPs, however, should not lead to problems con-
cerning public auditors. Almost all, if not all, public companies are
audited by the Big Five, and all underwriters and investment bankers
require companies going through an initial public offering to use one
of the Big Five. Very few, if any, public company audit firms are small
enough to fall within the proposed exception to Rule 5.4.
245 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 143-186 and accompanying text.
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V. HAVE LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS CONTINUED TO INTEGRATE
LEGAL AND NONLEGAL PROFESSIONS?
Many commentators and practitioners inside and outside the le-
gal community have accused the ABA of "burying their heads in the
sand" and ignoring the MDP issue. 254
 The recent vote to leave Rule
5.4 as is and disband the Multidisciplinary Practice Commission after
only a superficial study is evidence of such behavior. 255 Lawyers in
support of MDPs have not abandoned their desire to work/partner
with other professions. 256 Many law firms are branching out into law-
related businesses and using Rule 5.7 as a shield. 257
 Rule 5.7 allows law
firms to operate "law-related services" if the service is provided in con-
junction with, and in substance relates to, the provision of legal serv-
ices. 258
 Such services have included document management, litigation
consultation, technology solutions, investigative work and real estate
services.259
 MDP proponents are pushing the definition of "law related
services" to meet their needs and expand their firms' practices into
non-traditional areas. 260
 One MDP proponent utilizing Rule 5.7 to his
advantage views such arrangements as MDPs with a different name. 261
These lawyers are quick to point out that the issue of MDPs and law-
yers sharing fees is not going away no matter what actions are taken by
the ABA.262
More discussion is needed concerning potential modifications to
Rule 5.4 that will allow MDP environments in small firms while simul-
taneously preventing large firms, i.e., the Big Five, from operating
MDPs. The proposed non-uniform modification to Rule 5.4 should be
viewed positively by MDP proponents as a constructive step forward
and as a test case to seethe effects an MDP environment may have on
the legal community. MDP advocates, however, may initially speak out
against such a limited rule change (since the MDP movement has
been primarily pushed by the large accounting firms), but after
reflection may realize it may be a step forward in their direction, al-
254 See, e.g., Covaleski, supra note 9, at 1; Noteboom, supra note 38, at 1398; Stein, supra
note 1, at 1546.
253 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
256 See John Gibeaut, Cash Boughs, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 50,
232 See id.
2551 See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 13, at 96-97.
252 See Gibeaut, supra note 256, at 52.
26° See id.
261 see id.
262 See id.
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beit a small one. MDP critics likely would chastise the ABA for such a
decision, focusing on the potential downward spiral of the legal pro-
fession. After further reflection, however, opponents should realize
that this proposal is attempting , to take practical steps to better the
majority of the legal profession, rather than voting merely as a defen-
sive reaction against a perceived threat.
Even if the ABA and the states decide a partial modification to
Rule 5.4 is not in the best interest of the entire profession, the ABA
should develop a plan and announce a renewed effort to identify,
prosecute and prevent the unauthorized practice of law in the United
States. 263 By voting to maintain the status quo when everyone is aware
of extensive violations taking place regarding the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, the ABA insults the integrity of the legal profession and
sends a clear message to violators, "we don't approve of your actions,
but we are going to do nothing about it, therefore, go right ahead." 264
The ABA must be consistent in its message. If it is their position that
MDPs are bad for the profession, they must vigorously identify and
stop illegal MDPs already in existence. 265
CONCLUSION
MDPs are not a new phenomenon, but as the Big Five continued
to expand and push the envelope with regard to what may be consid-
ered "the practice of law," the ABA needed to take action. By forming
a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practices and studying the issue
for nearly two years, the ABA appeared to be taking steps in the right
direction. Unfortunately, this progress was brought to an abrupt halt
when the Bar Delegates voted against the Commission's recommenda-
tion to permit MDPs while simultaneously disbanding the Commis-
sion—what appeared to be the end of the ABA's inquiry. This was,
however, not the end of society's efforts to create MDPs. Nothing has
changed due to the ABA's vote; the Big Five continue their activities,
which arguably represent the practice of law, with no deterrence from
the ABA, and lawyers who wish to practice in MDP environments ap-
pear to be getting around Rule 5.4 by using Rule 5.7 (ancillary busi-
nesses) as a shield.
While it is important to ensure that the hallmarks of the legal
profession (independent judgment, loyalty, and confidentiality) are
"3 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 137, at 1107-08; Stein, supra note 1, at 1535.
264 See Fox, supra note 137, at 1107-08; Stein, supra note 1, at 1535.
445 See Fox, supra note.137, at 1107-08; Stein, supra note 1, at 1535.
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not destroyed through the creation of MDPs, it is critical to ensure all
possibilities have been considered before ending further inquiry into
the subject. The ABA decided not to allow MDPs under any circum-
stance. It did not consider, however, the possibility of a rule change
that would not apply to all law firms uniformly. This is but one of
many creative and unique solutions the ABA should consider before
closing the book on the issue. It is clear that the legal profession is
one based strongly on history and precedent, but economic and so-
cietal conditions do change and the legal profession must consider
change to adapt and remain strong, allowing it to better meet the
needs of clients and remain a guiding force in our society.
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